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Introduction
Announcements of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) generate substantial appreciation of the targets' equity. The stock prices of target companies increase on average by more than 20% during the M&A announcements, as illustrated in Figure 1 . In this paper, we analyze the holdings of mutual funds and hedge funds around takeover announcements to identify the institutions that benefit from owning equity in the takeover targets around these announcements.
Investors can generate abnormal returns in financial markets either by having access to private information that is not yet incorporated into asset prices or by having superior ability to process publicly available information. Analyzing the patterns in holdings changes around merger announcements helps us to better understand the strategies institutional investors use to create value in their portfolios. While a substantial literature documents that the performance of mutual funds and other institutional investors is related to several fund characteristics, 1 there is a paucity of research on the specific investment strategies that institutional investors use to generate abnormal performance. Our paper sheds light on this question by analyzing whether mutual funds and hedge funds benefit from modifying their holdings on impending takeover targets. Different types of institutional investors might rely on different methods to create value for their shareholders, because they exhibit important differences in their compensations, regulatory restrictions, and trading strategies. For example, whereas mutual funds typically charge asset-based fees that are not very sensitive to prior performance, hedge funds also frequently charge performance-based fees. Whereas mutual funds face significant regulatory restrictions and disclosure requirements, hedge funds are less regulated and offer limited transparency. Moreover, whereas mutual funds typically follow more straight-forward long-1 See for example, Carhart (1997) , Wermers (2000) , Chen, Jagadeesh, and Wermers (2000) , Zheng (2005, 2008) , Massa and Rehman (2008) , Bodnaruk, Massa, and Simonov (2009) only investment strategies, hedge funds often take advantage of more complex investment strategies that use derivatives, short-selling, and leverage. 2 These differences might create different incentives for different types of institutional investors to obtain private information and to process complex public information. For instance, hedge funds might have superior access to information about potential takeover candidates or they might have superior ability to predict which companies might become takeover candidates based on public information than mutual funds.
To study the holdings of institutional investors around merger announcements, we analyze a sample of 8,666 completed and withdrawn M&A transactions announced from 1990 through 2015. Our main result shows that mutual funds reduce their exposure to takeover candidates in the quarter prior to the merger announcement. Specifically, we find that, on average, mutual fund ownership in takeover targets decreases from 5.53% to 5.35% as a fraction of the target's shares outstanding during the calendar quarter preceding the public merger announcement. Our evidence indicates that many mutual funds forgo profitable investment opportunities by partially (or fully) liquidating their positions in impending takeover candidates.
In contrast to mutual funds, we find that hedge funds substantially increase their holdings in takeover candidates in the quarters prior to the merger announcement. On average, the aggregate hedge fund ownership increases from 3.44% to 3.66% during the quarter prior to the merger announcement. Our results indicate that trading strategies around merger announcements differ substantially between mutual funds and hedge funds.
We shed light on the mechanisms behind target ownership changes by mutual funds and hedge funds. We begin by identifying fund management companies that advise bidders and takeover targets. These management companies might obtain early access to the information about a forthcoming takeover announcement. We find that the youngest funds in such fund families significantly increase their ownership in takeover targets prior to M&A announcements. This result is consistent with the cross-subsidization hypothesis of Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2006) , who show that mutual fund families have an incentive to favor their high-value funds (e.g., high-fee, high-performance, and young funds).
We also analyze whether there are important cross-sectional differences among institutional investors who trade the targets' equity prior to merger announcements. We use four different proxies for active management: the Active Share of Cremers and Petajisto (2009) , the Tracking Error, the R 2 of Amihud and Goyenko (2013), and the absolute value of the Return Gap of Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008) . Our findings indicate that closetindexers tend to forgo the largest benefits of takeover announcements by selling out their shares in takeover targets prematurely. We find that mutual funds that are more actively managed tend to decrease their ownership of future takeover targets to a lesser extent.
We also study whether the hedge fund results are driven by the activist hedge funds identified by Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2015) . We identify acquisition targets held by hedge fund activists who file a Schedule 13D during the 365-day period before the M&A announcement date. Of 8,300 M&A targets, 79 are both activism and acquisition targets.
Our results show that hedge fund activists significantly increase their stakes in these 79 target companies prior to M&A deal announcements. In contrast, ownership changes by non-activist hedge funds (i.e., those without a Schedule 13D filing) are insignificant. These findings suggest a possible channel that generates gains for some hedge funds.
Our study contributes to the active debate on whether institutional investors profit from takeover announcements. Jegadeesh and Tang (2010) investigate whether institutional investors obtain inside information of takeover announcements. They find that trades of funds as a group are not profitable. However, they find that institutional investors whose main broker is also a target advisor are net buyers of target shares before announcements and their pre-announcement trades are significantly profitable. In contrast, Griffin, Shu, and Topaloglu (2012) are unable to find much evidence to support that investment bank clients take advantage of connections through takeover advising using broker-level trading data. They conclude that institutional investors are reluctant to use insider information in traceable manners. Whereas those papers are primarily interested in the short-term trading immediately prior to the merger announcement, we analyze trades over longer horizons. Furthermore, our data includes a broader set of mutual fund and hedge funds investors than these two prior papers albeit at a lower frequency. In a related study, Dai, Massoud, Nandy, and Saunders (2014) analyze the trading of different types of hedge funds around merger announcements. They find that, on average, short-term hedge funds purchase 3.2% of a target's shares in the quarter immediately prior to the public announcement of an M&A deal, whereas long term hedge funds, on average sell 1.1% of the target's shares during the same quarter. In contrast with the work of Dai et al., our paper focuses on the overall trades of institutional investors and contrasts mutual funds and hedge funds.
This study also contributes to the literature that investigates the specific methods that institutional investors use to create value for their investors. Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008) find that fund managers exhibit superior performance when they trade shares of firms they are connected to through their educational networks. Baker, Litov, Wachter, and Wurgler (2010) find that a significant amount of outperformance of mutual funds takes place around corporate earnings announcements. Swem (2015) shows that hedge fund trades predict the direction of subsequent analyst ratings change reports, while mutual fund trades do not. Similarly, trades around merger announcements can also provide an explanation of how institutional investors create value for their shareholders. Our paper shows that some investment managers create value by increasing their holdings in prospective takeover targets.
The paper proceeds as follows. We describe the sample construction and the summary statistics in Section 2. Section 3 includes the empirical results on trading by mutual funds and hedge funds. Section 4 sheds light on the mechanisms behind ownership changes by institutional investors, and Section 5 provides cross-sectional evidence. The last section concludes.
Data and Sample Construction
The data for this study come from several sources. First, we obtain data on M&A deals for the period of 1990 through 2015. The initial sample consists of 34,144 transactions with the following deal characteristics: mergers, acquisitions, and acquisitions of a majority interest.
We eliminate small deals with a transaction value below $1 million. This yields 29, 190 transactions. In addition, we require targets to be publicly traded firms. After imposing these criteria our sample consists of 8,666 completed and withdrawn M&A transactions.
Second, we obtain mutual fund monthly returns, expenses, total net assets, turnover ratio, and other fund characteristics from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Survivor-Bias-Free Mutual Fund database. Third, the Thomson holdings database provides data on mutual fund equity holdings. To merge the Thomson holdings database with the CRSP Mutual fund database, we use MFLINKS from the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). To examine the evolution of hedge fund trading in target firms, we identify those within the pool of all 13F institutions reported in Thomson Financial. We use the hedge fund identifier from Maslennikov and Hund (2015) . 3 Individual stock prices and returns are from the CRSP monthly stock file. Table 1 (2007)).
Panel A of
The benefit of owning a target's equity during the M&A announcement is substantial. Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of the average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around M&As during the trading day window [-250; +55] relative to the deal announcement date.
We calculate cumulative abnormal returns as CAR ij = t j=1 (r ij − r mj ), where r ij is a firm's i s return and r mj is the CRSP value-weighted market return at time j. To mitigate the effect of delisting on CARs after announcements, we set abnormal returns of delisted targets to zero. The three-day average cumulative abnormal return for the targets in our sample is 21%. We find a significant increase in the prices of target companies prior to the M&A announcement, as shown by Keown and Pinkerton (1981) and Schwert (1996) .
We focus on actively-managed domestic equity mutual funds. We start with a sample of 3,864 funds for the period 1990-2015 in the Thomson holdings database with available fund names and with the following investment objective styles: aggressive growth, growth, and growth and income. We eliminate index funds by screening out fund names for the following words: "Index," "Indx," "Market," "S&P," "ETF," and "NYSE." This procedure produces a sample of 3,748 unique funds. Consistent with other studies (e.g. Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng, 2008), we remove fund observations with fewer than 11 stocks in a portfolio. As a result, we obtain 3,640 funds.
Next, we record fund returns, total net assets under management (TNA), and other fund characteristics (e.g., turnover, expense ratio) from the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free Mutual Fund database and merge these data with the Thomson holdings database. There are a number of mutual funds with multiple share classes. Typically, fund share classes differ in fee structure and clientele (e.g., institutional or retail). Similar to the procedure used by Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008) and Wermers, Yao, and Zhao (2012), we combine multiple share classes into one fund. We then calculate the TNA for each fund as the sum of all values of assets across multiple fund shares. Fund age is the maximum age of its share classes. For the remaining fund characteristics, we aggregate different share classes by taking the TNA-weighted average across all share classes of a fund.
We exclude the first 18 months of fund returns to decrease the impact of the incubation bias reported by Evans (2010) . In addition, we require non-missing fund returns and nonmissing total net assets under management. After applying these filters, we keep 2,128 funds. Because Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2001) suggest that the returns of funds with TNA less than $15 million are biased upwards in the CRSP Mutual Fund database, we exclude all funds with TNAs below $15 million as of the beginning of the month. In addition, we require non-missing fund characteristics (age, turnover, and expense ratio).
Our final sample contains 1,791 unique funds. Table 1 provides summary statistics for our final sample of mutual funds.
Panel B of
These are calculated from 65,854 fund×quarter observations. The average fund in our sample manages $1.99 billion in assets, is 18 years old, has an expense ratio of 1.22%, and exhibits a turnover ratio of 80%. On average, funds achieve a raw portfolio return net of expenses of 2.24% per quarter. These summary statistics are consistent with those documented in the literature (e.g., Huang, Sialm, and Zhang (2011), Amihud and Goyenko (2013) , and Jiang and Verardo (2013)).
To construct our sample of hedge funds, we obtain institutional holdings from the Thomson database over the period of 1990-2015. There are 6,569 unique institutional investors who file a 13F schedule during this time period. Using the updated identifier from Maslennikov and Hund (2015), we obtain 1,162 unique hedge funds. Based on the reported 13F holdings across 31,089 fund×quarter observations, an average hedge fund holds about 93 stocks in its portfolio. This constitutes about $885 million in equity holdings. 4 
Mutual Fund and Hedge Fund Trading in Takeover Targets
In this section we analyze the holdings of mutual funds and hedge funds around takeover announcements. We present both univariate and multivariate analyses.
Univariate Analysis for Overall Sample
We start by examining the aggregate mutual fund and hedge fund ownership in takeover targets around the M&A announcement. For each target, we calculate the total number of shares held by all mutual funds in our sample as a fraction of total shares outstanding in each of the four quarters prior to the M&A announcement quarter, which are denoted as Q(t − 4) through Q(t − 1). 5 Similarly, we aggregate hedge fund ownership for each to-be target and analyze the ownership by these funds as a fraction of shares outstanding. We also report the holdings of mutual funds and hedge funds at the end of the announcement quarter Q(t). These results must be interpreted with caution because it is not clear whether the positions in takeover targets were acquired before or after the public announcements. For both mutual funds and hedge funds, we test the statistical significance of the changes 5 We adjust holdings for stock splits by multiplying the reported number of shares by the CRSP adjustment factor. in takeover target ownership during the merger pre-announcement period. Table 2 reports the results. We find that mutual fund ownership in takeover targets significantly decreases by 18 basis points (from 5.53% to 5.35%) one quarter prior to the announcement quarter.
The average change in aggregate mutual fund ownership during the previous quarters is small in magnitude. In contrast, we observe persistent significant increases in target ownership by hedge funds during the quarters preceding the M&A announcement quarter. The average change in hedge fund ownership in takeover targets from quarter Q(t−4) to quarter Q(t − 1) is 51 basis points (from 3.15% to 3.66%).
We estimate the economic effects of declining mutual fund holdings prior to merger announcements by calculating the dollar amount of these changes in target holdings. We find the product of the change in aggregate mutual fund shares and the end-of-quarter target share price (in the quarter prior to the M&A announcement quarter), and then add up these products across all target firms in each M&A announcement quarter.
Univariate Analysis for Subsamples
We also perform univariate tests for various subsamples based on various deal characteristics of merger announcements, as reported in Table 3 . We divide in Panel A our sample of M&A transactions based on the timing of their announcements during the event quarter.
The timing of the announcement is informative because it helps us to better understand the timing of trades within a quarter. For example, if a merger announcement takes place at the beginning of quarter t, then the holdings at the end of quarter t − 1 are more likely to incorporate the trades by institutions that anticipate an imminent takeover announcement.
On the other hand, the holdings at the end of quarter t − 1 are less likely to incorporate a takeover announcement that occurs at the end of quarter t. Of the 8,300 deals, 1,699 are announced within the first 20 calendar days of the quarter, 4,699 are announced in the middle of the quarter, and the remaining (1,902) deals become public within the last 20 calendar days of the announcement quarter. Our results show stronger ownership changes by funds for the transactions announced at the beginning of the event quarter. This is an indication that trading by mutual funds and hedge funds in takeover targets is accelerating immediately prior to the takeover announcement. Thus, the trades in quarter t − 1 prior to the announcement reported in Table 3 might understate the overall trading prior to the announcement since some of the trading likely occurs in the announcement quarter t.
In Panel B we separate the takeovers according to whether they were announced during Additionally, we examine in Panels C and D whether funds' purchases are stronger (weaker) in targets with higher (lower) premiums and three-day CARs around the deal announcements. We sort targets based on SDC premiums and the three-day CARs around M&A announcements. We find that hedge fund buying activity is stronger for targets that experience lower CARs around announcements and lower premiums. Overall, these findings suggest that even though hedge funds may have information about upcoming merger announcements or possess a special skill in identifying takeover targets, hedge fund managers, on average, might not be able to identify the deals with the highest announcement returns. However, it is also possible that hedge fund trading increases the pre-announcement price of to-be target which, in turn, may lower the observed premium.
An interesting finding is that mutual funds substantially reduce their ownership in targets associated with tender offers (by 62 basis points) relatively to non-tender deals (by 8 basis points), as reported in Panel E. Tender offers are generally more of a surprise than non-tender offers, which may explain why we see stronger selling activity among mutual funds for this type of deal.
Overall, our results on various sample sorts suggest that mutual funds are generally uninformed about forthcoming M&A announcements, as their ownership reduction is stronger for deals announced at the beginning of the event quarter and for tender offers. For hedge funds, possible drivers of their trading prior to the public announcements could be due to private information, managerial ability to identify to-be targets, or both. While we do not take a particular stand on the mechanism behind this behavior, it appears that mutual funds, in the aggregate, "leave money on the table," and hedge funds pick it up. As noted earlier, the economic effects of these trading dynamics are substantial. Our results provide a striking contrast between mutual funds and hedge funds with respect to their trading behavior in to-be M&A targets.
Multivariate Analysis
While the univariate analysis is informative about the overall dynamic pattern of trades by mutual funds and hedge funds around takeover announcements, it does not control for target characteristics. Controlling for target characteristics is important since the sample of observations in the univariate tests is selected based on whether a company becomes a takeover target. Hedge funds might purchase stocks with specific characteristics (e.g., value stocks).
These stocks might also be more likely to become takeover targets, because acquiring companies might consider the same characteristics when selecting potential takeover targets.
Furthermore, hedge funds might not only increase their positions in takeover candidates, which experience a significant increase in stock prices at the announcement, they might also increase their positions in similar firms that fail to become takeover candidates and therefore might experience a decline in their stock prices since the anticipated acquisition does not materialize.
To address these concerns, we run a logit regression that predicts whether a company becomes a target using the universe of publicly traded firms and controlling for firm characteristics. These specifications explore the effect of mutual fund and hedge fund ownership (both in levels and in changes during the M&A pre-announcement period) on the probability of a takeover. In Table 4 , we run regressions in which the dependent variable is one if a firm is a takeover target during the announcement quarter, Q(t), and 0, otherwise. The variables of interest in these regressions include the mutual and hedge fund level ownership in firms in Q(t − 4), as well as the changes in ownership by these institutional investors during the quarters preceding the M&A announcement quarter. The control variables are the target firm's market capitalization, one-year stock return, and market-to-book ratio.
These controls capture popular quantitative investment strategies based on size, value, and momentum. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level and the regressions include time-fixed effects and two-digit SIC fixed effects.
The results in Table 4 
Mechanisms
In this section, we explore possible mechanisms that might explain the trading activity of mutual funds and hedge funds around M&A announcements. Fund management companies that serve as M&A advisors to targets and acquirers may provide information about forthcoming deal announcements to their affiliated funds. We therefore analyze trading by mutual funds whose management company serves as an M&A advisor to targets or acquirers. Also, changes in hedge fund holdings might also be related to hedge fund activism.
Consequently, we also explore the trading activity in to-be targets by hedge fund activists.
Mutual Fund Affiliation with M&A Advisors
Growing evidence suggests that financial conglomerates may exploit their access to private information in various ways. Bodnaruk, Massa, and Simonov (2009) document that financial conglomerates in which affiliated investment banks advise acquirer firms take positions in target companies before M&A deal announcements. Massa and Rehman (2008) find that mutual fund managers increase their holdings in companies that borrow from their affiliated banks. These authors document that such trading is profitable, as fund managers may take advantage of informal channels through their affiliation with lending banks. Jegadeesh and Tang (2010) also study institutional trades around takeover announcements. They provide evidence that funds whose main broker is also a target advisor are net buyers of target shares before announcements and their pre-announcement trades are significantly profitable.
In our sample, some mutual funds are affiliated with financial conglomerates that also provide M&A advisory services. Out of the 1,791 funds in our sample, 1,782 have information about their affiliated management company name. The target M&A advisor name is available for 7,442 (out of 8,666) deals, and the acquirer M&A advisor name is available for about 62% of our sample offers (5,336 transactions). Some companies have multiple M&A advisors. We identify funds affiliated with M&A advisors by name matching and examine their ownership in to-be targets prior to deal announcements. 7 Panel A of Table 5 reports the ownership of the target company by mutual funds whose management company advises M&A bidders or targets. The target ownership by funds that are affiliated with M&A bidder advisors declines by about 0.014% during the three quarters prior to the deal announcement quarter. This finding is consistent with those reported for all mutual funds in our sample (Tables 2 and 4 ). In contrast, the funds affiliated with M&A target advisors increase their ownership by about 0.012% in takeover targets in the three quarters prior to the merger announcements. It is not clear whether this increase in ownership is due to an anticipation in a future takeover or if fund companies with increasing ownership stakes are more likely to be selected as advisors by potential takeover targets.
An indication that the ownership changes are not driven by short-term information about an upcoming takeover announcement is provided by the fact that the ownership does not change in the quarter immediately prior to the takeover announcement. Overall, the changes in target ownership by mutual funds, whose management company advises either bidders or targets, are not significant.
We further explore the informational channel between mutual funds and their management companies. Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2006) show empirical evidence that fund management companies engage in strategic cross-fund subsidization within families. Those authors argue that management companies may favor some funds within their families because these favored funds are most likely to increase overall family profits.
We follow the methodology of Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2006) Table 5 reports the evolution of ownership by high-value funds affiliated with investment companies that advise M&A targets in quarters prior to the merger announcements. Overall, we do not find a significant increase in ownership for high-value funds. Of these high-value funds, the highest-fee funds exhibit no clear directional movement toward target stakes, as they significantly increase their ownership in target firms from Q(t − 3)
to Q(t − 2), but then reduce it by a similar amount. We observe no significant ownership changes by funds with the strongest performance, whether they belong to families with or without M&A advisor relationships. In contrast, our results show that ownership by the youngest funds in the family that is among a target's M&A advisors significantly increases in the quarters preceding the deal announcement quarter. Thus, we find mixed evidence on cross-subsidization effects for families affiliated with M&A advisors. (2008) also document improvements in target firms' operating performance associated with hedge fund activism. Such positive outcomes can be explained by activists' intervention and the disciplinary mechanism imposed on the management of target firms. In contrast, Greenwood and Schor (2009) argue that most of the activism announcement returns are explained by activists' ability to force target firms into a takeover. Greenwood and Schor (2009) suggest that activists target certain firms because they anticipate that those companies will soon be acquired. Gantchev and Jotikasthira (2017) demonstrate that institutional sales raise a firm's probability of becoming an activist target and Boyson, Gantchev, and Shivdasani (2017) find that activist interventions substantially increase the probability of a takeover offer. While it is not straightforward to disentangle the drivers of the market reaction to activism announcements, it is plausible that hedge fund activists influence corporate management decisions; and through this relation with a firm's management, hedge fund managers may have access to information that other market participants do not.
Hedge Fund Activism
We explore this plausible channel between hedge fund activists and their target firms. firms are also acquisition targets held by activists who filed 13D during the 365-day period before the M&A announcement date.
We next examine the trading activity by activists in takeover targets prior to M&A announcements. Panel A of Table 6 reports ownership for the identified activists holding shares of all M&A target firms in our sample (they may or may not be activism targets).
Consistent with our baseline results for hedge funds (see Table 2 ), activists increase their ownership in M&A targets prior to deal announcements. Table 6 includes hedge fund activist ownership in 79 activism targets that are also M&A targets held by funds who file a Schedule 13D within one year before the merger announcement date. Panel C reports the percentage ownership in these firms by Non-activist hedge funds. In the subset of the 79 firms that are both activism and M&A targets, the increasing trend in hedge fund ownership prior to deal announcements is mostly driven by activists' trading. On one hand, it could be that hedge fund activists are better able to force targets into a takeover. On the other hand, it is also plausible that hedge fund activists could take advantage of their access to private information.
Panel B of
We also compute hedge fund ownership for transactions excluding the activist hedge funds, and all hedge fund ownership in the 79 activism and takeover targets. The results are reported in Panels D and E of Table 6 . The findings in these sub-samples are consistent with the baseline tests for all hedge funds in suggesting that ownership changes in target firms. Overall, the evidence in Table 6 shows that activism is one of several possible channels for value creation by hedge funds.
Cross-Sectional Evidence
In this section we study whether there are systematic differences in trading across mutual funds around takeover announcements.
Fund Activeness
We explore whether trading in takeover targets is a function of managerial activeness.
From the aggregate mutual fund analyses described above, we transition to the fund-by-deal setting in this section. We consider several measures of mutual fund activeness. First, we use the Active Share classification proposed by Cremers and Petajisto (2009) . Active Share is computed as the share of portfolio positions that differ from the benchmark index holdings.
Our second measure of activeness is T racking Error, which is the standard deviation in error terms from regressions of excess fund return on excess index returns. Third, we follow the methodology of Amihud and Goyenko (2013) and construct a measure of stockselectivity, F und (1 − R 2 ). R 2 comes from four-factor regressions using the previous 36 monthly return observations. Since a lower R 2 is indicative of greater selectivity, we subtract its value from 1 for easier comparability with the other activeness measures. Our fourth measure of activeness is the absolute value of the Return gap, proposed by Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008) . This measure is the difference between the reported fund return and the return on the portfolio that consists of previously disclosed holdings. 10 Our dataset consists of 11,265,516 fund-by-deal observations, including funds that exist at the time of the deal announcement, but that do not hold a takeover target. We estimate regressions in which the dependent variable is the change in mutual fund ownership, constructed by subtracting a log(1+#shares held) in quarter (t−2) from a log(1+#shares held) in quarter (t − 1), given that quarter t is the deal announcement quarter. If a fund does not own shares of a to-be target, its number of shares held is set to zero. The independent variables of interest are the active management measures described above. Other independent variables include fund, deal, and target characteristics. Unless otherwise specified, all independent variables are measured as of quarter (t − 2). Table 7 reports the results. We find a strong positive relation between the change in fund ownership in takeover targets prior to M&A announcements and fund activeness. This evidence suggests that more active mutual funds either increase or do not decrease their stake in to-be targets as much as other mutual funds do. Even though the mutual fund sector, as a whole, significantly decreases their holdings in targets prior to deal announcement (as shown in Table 2 ), active funds appear to be either informed or skillful enough to predict takeover targets.
We further explore the possibility that the trading behavior by active funds is common regardless of a company's potential to become a takeover target. In other words, we examine if more active funds exhibit the same trading tendencies in otherwise similar non-target stocks. We run a propensity score matching procedure to generate a control sample that consists of firms that have comparable characteristics as the target companies, except that the control firms are not associated with takeovers at a given point in time.
In the propensity score matching analysis, we run a logistic regression modeling the probability of a firm being a takeover target. We use all firms in CRSP for the period 1990- 10 Our results are qualitatively consistent when using either Return gap or its absolute value. 2015 as the universe of stocks and create a stock-by-quarter dataset. To identify takeover targets, we use the 34,144 M&A transactions reported in SDC over the period of 1990-2015.
We then merge the universe of CRSP stocks with the set of SDC acquisition deals on the basis of a target's identifier and the merger announcement quarter. This procedure generates 8,797 targets. This number of targets is slightly greater than our sample of 8,666 targets because we do not apply the deal size filter for modeling the probability of a firm becoming an acquisition target. We therefore have 8,797 treated observations and 734,476 untreated firm-quarter observations for the logistic regression analysis. We estimate a logit regression where the dependent variable is 1 if a firm is a takeover target in quarter t (announcement quarter), and 0, otherwise. We model the takeover probability as a function of a stock's market capitalization, quarterly return, market-to-book ratio, leverage, and liquidity. These independent variables are measured as of quarter (t − 1), unless specified. Table 8 , we report the logit regression of the probability of becoming a takeover target. The results in column 1 of Panel A are generally consistent with those of other studies that examine the probability of becoming an acquisition target (e.g. Palepu (2015)). For example, we find that small and value firms are more likely to become takeover targets. Neither firm leverage nor liquidity loads significantly in our logit regression. Columns 2 and 3 report the average values of characteristics for both the treatment (i.e., targets) and control groups.
In Panel A of
The last column presents p-values associated with differences in the treatment and control sample means. None of the average characteristics of the treatment group are statistically different from those of the control group. We use the control sample of 6,182 companies generated from the propensity score matching technique for the following analyses.
We repeat the procedure related to the change in ownership by mutual funds. However, instead of using the target firms in our sample, we use the control firms from the propensity score matching approach. As noted earlier, the control group firms possess similar characteristics to those of the target firms, except that the control sample firms are not takeover targets. Since the control group contains untreated observations, there are no M&A deal characteristics associated with these firms. Thus, we include the firm and fund controls, but no deal controls.
Looking at the results in Panel B of Table 8 , across all specifications, the mutual fund activeness measures are not positively associated with the change in ownership in the control sample firms. This evidence suggests that active funds' portfolio rebalancing of takeover targets prior to deal announcements is not random. Therefore, our analyses indicate that the "targetness" of some firms influences the trading behavior by actively managed funds.
Persistence
The estimates in Table 7 indicate that portfolio changes are systematically related with the activeness of the funds. We explore whether this tendency of allocating higher (lower) portfolio weights to target firms is persistent over time. We sort all mutual funds based on the total portfolio weights of holdings in one or more M&A targets at the end of the quarter prior to the announcement quarter after eliminating funds with zero-weights in target firms.
We then examine the portfolio weights allocated to future target firms in the following four quarters. That is, in Q(t − 1), we sort all funds in terciles based on the weight allocated to targets announced in Q(t). Afterwards, we calculate the weight allocated by funds in each tercile in Q(t) to firms that become targets in Q(t + 1). Using this method, we also compute the weights in to-be targets in Q(t + 2) and Q(t + 3). Table 9 reports average weights allocated to takeover targets by funds in each tercile formed in Q(t − 1). We compute the differences in average weights for the highest and lowest terciles, and report Newey-West-adjusted t-statistics. The results show that portfolio weights allocated to target firms announced in the following quarter are persistent over time. This evidence suggests that mutual funds dedicating higher portfolio weights to target firms announced in the next quarter tend to allocate significantly higher weights to future M&A targets.
Panel A of
We perform similar tests on the hedge funds' portfolio weights in to-be takeover targets.
The results are reported in Panel B of Table 9 . Similar to the outcomes for the mutual fund sample, we observe persistence in portfolio weights in takeover targets allocated by hedge funds.
Conclusion
We analyze the holdings of institutional investors around takeover announcements to identify whether some investors benefit from these transactions. We find that while mutual funds generally reduce their exposure to takeover candidates in the quarters prior to the merger announcement, hedge funds increase it. Overall, our results suggest that mutual fund managers are generally uninformed about future merger and acquisition deals. In contrast, more highly incentivized institutions, such as hedge funds, are able to gain from the large announcement effect of M&A transactions to a substantially greater extent.
Figure 1: Cumulative Abnormal Returns around Merger Announcements
This figure illustrates the evolution of the equal-weighted average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around merger announcements. We calculate cumulative abnormal returns as CAR ij = t j=1 (r ij − r mj ), where r ij is a firm's i s return and r mj is the CRSP value-weighted market return at time j. To mitigate the effect of delisting on CARs after announcements, we set abnormal returns of delisted targets to zero. This figure illustrates the evolution of the mutual fund and hedge fund ownership in acquisition targets around merger announcements. We sum up all shares held by mutual funds (hedge funds) for each company in each quarter. We then obtain aggregate ownership by dividing the summed shares held by total shares outstanding. This graph displays the average ownership by mutual funds (hedge funds) across all deals in the sample several quarters prior, during, and one quarter after the announcement quarter. 
8,300 -0.21*** 0.36*** (-5.99) (10.62)
8,300 -0.13*** 0.51*** (-2.79) (12.68) Q(t) − Q(t − 1) 7,928 -1.50*** 1.90*** (-32.74) (33.04) Table 3 : Mutual fund and hedge fund ownership in takeover targets by subsamples This table reports the average mutual fund and hedge fund ownership (in %) and changes in ownership in takeover targets during the M&A pre-announcement period. We denote Q(t) as the merger announcement quarter. Mutual (hedge) fund ownership is the total number of shares held by mutual (hedge) funds in our sample as a fraction of total shares outstanding. This table reports mutual fund and hedge fund ownership associated for the targets sorted on the basis of CARs, SDC premium, tender (non-tender) offers, and announcement period. The t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
-0.05 0.25*** -0.24*** 0.86*** (-0.83) (6.37) (-3.53) (1.05) 
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-0.18*** 0.11*** -0.17*** 0.33*** (-3.33)
-0.12* 0.37*** -0.13*** 0.64*** (-1.80) ( 
-0.62*** 0.22*** -0.08*** 0.23*** (-5.73) (3.50) (-3.02) (7.88)
-0.53*** 0.47*** -0.04 0.53*** (-4.29) (4.55) (-0.83) (11.91) Table 4 : Mutual fund and hedge fund trading in targets and takeover probability This table reports the logit regression results relating mutual and hedge fund ownership levels and changes with the probability of a firm becoming a takeover target. We use all firms in CRSP for the period 1990-2015 as the universe of stocks. We run the logit regression with a dependent variable equal to 1 if a firm is a takeover target, and 0, otherwise. The key explanatory variables are the mutual fund (MF) and hedge fund (HF) ownership in levels and changes. To obtain the aggregate ownership by mutual (hedge) funds, we sum up all shares held by mutual (hedge) funds and divide by total shares outstanding (TSO). Other controls include one-year return, market-to-book ratio, and a natural logarithm of market capitalization. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% level. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. P-values are reported in parentheses. Symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable = Target (0, 1) in Q(t) Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2006) , we identify high-value funds as those that either charge the highest fees, or show the strongest performance, or are the youngest relatively to other funds in fund family. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A : Ownership (%) by funds whose management company serves as an M&A advisor Management company is among a target s M&A advisors
0.055 0.063 0.063 0.008** 0.012*** -0.000 (1.93) (2.42) (-0.03) Management company is among an acquirer s M&A advisors
0.059 0.055 0.048 -0.004 -0.014*** -0.007* (-1.13) (-2.77) (-1.85) Management company is either among a target s M&A advisors or among an acquirer s M&A advisors
Continued on next page 
0.028 0.034 0.034 0.006 0.004 0.000 (1.51) (0.87) (0.00) The youngest funds in the family that is among a target's M&A advisors
0.007 0.010 0.015 0.003** 0.010*** 0.005** (2.46) (3.56) (2.30) The highest-fee funds in the family that is among a target's M&A advisors
0.009 0.015 0.010 0.006*** -0.003 -0.005** (2.69) (-1.52) (-2.21) Funds with strongest performance in the same investment objective category and whose family is among a target's advisors
0.019 0.021 0.018 0.002 0.000 -0.003 (0.58) (0.01) (-1.14) The youngest funds relatively to other funds in the family (families with and without advisor roles) Panel A reports the results from the propensity score matching analysis. Panel B reports the results of analyses for the sample of funds and the control group, generated from the propensity score matching procedure. We follow the methodology similar to that described for Table 7 . However, instead of the set of takeover targets, we use the control group sample. In addition, since the control group contains untreated observations, we are not able to control for deal characteristics. We control for fund and stock characteristics that include a fund's size, portfolio return, age, expense ratio, turnover ratio, flows, as well as a stock's market capitalization, return, and turnover. The dependent variable is a fund's difference in log(1 + sharesadj ( t)) and log(1 + sharesadj ( t − 1)) If a fund does not hold a stock that belongs to the control group, its number of adjusted shares is 0. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% level. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level. Coefficients are multiplied by 1,000. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. We sort all mutual funds based on the total portfolio weights of holdings in one or more M&A targets at the end of the quarter prior to the announcement quarter after eliminating those with zero-weights in target firms. We form terciles based on the weight allocated by mutual funds in each tercile in Q(t) to firms that become targets in Q(t + 1). We compute their portfolio weights in to-be targets in Q(t + 2) and Q(t + 3). Panel A reports average weights allocated to to-be targets by mutual funds in each tercile formed in Q(t − 1). Following this approach, we report average weights allocated to future takeover targets by hedge funds in Panel B. We calculate the differences in average weights for the highest and lowest terciles, and report Newey-West-adjusted t-statistics. Symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Appendices
Variable Definition
Fund characteristics
Log(Age) The natural logarithm of fund age (years) Expense ratio
Mutual fund expense ratio T urnover ratio Mutual fund turnover ratio Log(T N A)
The natural logarithm of total net assets under management (TNA) F lows
The quarterly growth rate of assets under management after adjusting for the appreciation of fund's assets (in %) 1Q f und return
The fund's quarterly return, obtained by compounding monthly returns net of expense 4-f actor alpha
The abnormal return from the Carhart (1997) four-factor models. For each fund, time-series regressions of excess monthly fund returns on four zeroinvestment factor portfolios along dimensions of excess market return, size, value, and momentum are estimated using the preceding 36 months of data. As in Carhart (1997) , the abnormal performance at time τ + 1 is computed by taking the fund return at time τ + 1 in excess of the risk-free rate and subtracting the fitted value of the return using the factor loadings estimated over the prior 36 months. The quarterly alphas are obtained by accumulating monthly fund alphas within each quarter M F (HF ) ownership
The total number of shares held by mutual funds (hedge funds) as a fraction of total shares outstanding
Measures of active management

Active Share
The share of portfolio holdings that differs from the benchmark index holdings, as in Cremers and Petajisto (2009) T racking error
The standard deviation of residuals obtained from regressing fund returns on excess index returns, as in Cremers and Petajisto (2009) F und R 2 R 2 , generated from regressing excess monthly fund returns net of expenses on four factors, using 36-month rolling windows, as suggested by Amihud and Goyenko (2013) 
Return gap
The difference between the reported fund return and the return on a portfolio that invests in the previously disclosed fund holdings, as in Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008)
Target characteristics
Log(mkt cap)
The natural logarithm of a target's market capitalization (price×total shares outstanding) 1Q stock return
The target's one-quarter return, obtained by compounding monthly returns Share turnover
The three-month average ratio of trading volume to total shares outstanding
